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The Value Added Tax (VAT)1 system in Botswana, introduced in July 2002, has since 
gone through several reforms. This includes: an increase in the VAT rate from its 
introductory rate of 10 per cent to the current 12 per cent in 2010; two increases in the 
registration threshold from the initial P250,000 (AUD32,000)2 to P500,000 
(AUD64,000) in 2010, and from P500,000 (AUD64,000) to the current P1,000,000 
(AUD128,000) in 2015 and; an increase in the number of zero-rated and exempted 
goods and services. Such reforms complicate the VAT system and increase VAT 
compliance costs, especially for small businesses. This paper explores possible VAT 
simplification measures for small businesses in Botswana, using the New Zealand GST 
system as a benchmark for a simplified VAT system. The New Zealand GST system is 
globally known as a model system, which has influenced GST designs in many 
countries. This study concludes with VAT policy implications for Botswana and 
potentially for similarly placed countries. The study recommends: broadening of the 
VAT base, reduction of VAT returns filing frequency and introduction of cash 
accounting for small businesses, as measures to simplify the VAT system in Botswana.  
 
 





                                                        
1 Also known as GST in other countries. These terms will be used interchangeably in this paper.   






This study aims to investigate possible measures that can be employed to simplify the 
Botswana VAT. The study draws on the policies employed by the New Zealand 
government to simplify their GST system. Small businesses are the main focus of this 
study because they are important to the economy of Botswana. Small businesses in 
Botswana are defined as enterprises employing between five and 25 people with an 
annual turnover of around P60,000–P1,500,000 (AUD7,680–AUD192,000).3  
 
The VAT system in Botswana is perceived to be burdensome and unreasonably 
complicated.4 To begin with, small businesses have to file VAT returns every two 
months and use an accrual method of accounting for VAT. In addition, some goods and 
services are VAT exempt. A complex VAT system makes compliance burdensome and 
elevates VAT compliance costs, particularly for small businesses. Prior studies indicate 
that the VAT is regressive and falls with disproportionate severity on small businesses.5 
Recent VAT compliance costs studies in Botswana reveal that the VAT system in 
Botswana is costly, burdensome and falls with disproportionate severity on small 
firms.6 To this end, this study investigates possible VAT simplification measures for 
small businesses in Botswana, using the New Zealand GST system as a benchmark for 
a simplified VAT/GST system. The New Zealand GST system is globally known as a 
model system. It is hoped that the recommendations that will emanate from this study 
will enlighten the government of Botswana (and potentially those of similarly placed 
countries) on possible ways through which the burden of VAT compliance on small 
businesses can be reduced through simplification of the VAT system.  
 
                                                        
3 Ibid.  
4 Makara and Rametse, “Taxpayer Attitudes, Compliance Benefits Perceptions and Compliance Costs of the Value 
Added Tax System in Botswana” (2018) 13(1) Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 246. 
5 These studies are summarised in the study by Tshepiso Makara and Jeff Pope “Estimates of the Compliance Costs 
of Value Added Tax in Botswana” (2013) 19(3) New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 183. 
6 See Makara and Pope, above n 5; Makara and Rametse, “Estimates of the Cash Flow and Managerial Benefits of 
Value Added Tax in Botswana” (2017) 23(4) New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 422; Makara and 
Rametse, above n 4.   
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1.2 Methodology and Limitations 
This study employs the case study research approach.  It is well known that case study 
research involves an in-depth, detailed study of an individual or a small group of 
individuals or an event. Such studies are typically qualitative in nature, resulting in a 
narrative description of behaviour or experience.7 This paper reviews the literature in 
order to investigate key elements of an optimal VAT design. In addition, the study 
examines the Botswana VAT and the New Zealand GST design features for its 
comparative case studies, with the aim of identifying possible VAT simplification 
measures that Botswana can adopt.  
 
It must be noted that Botswana and New Zealand differ in many respects, such as, socio-
economic environments, governance, political climate, size, tax structure and the 
development and administration capabilities of the revenue departments. As such, 
comparing these two countries may be problematic and “…more likely to mislead than 
enlighten”.8 Moreover, differences in definitions and other areas of focus can lead to a 
comparison of ‘apples and oranges’.9 Notwithstanding these risks, an investigation of 
the VAT/GST design features of the two countries is cautiously made, since such 
differences do not mean that Botswana cannot learn anything from the New Zealand 
GST system. Throughout this paper we use VAT and GST interchangeably, as well as 
the relevant label for a particular jurisdiction. 
 
In terms of a theoretical perspective, this paper adopts an institutional theory 
perspective. By institutional theory, we are focussing on the effects of institutions in 
society on political outcomes, including policy formation and legislative changes.10 It 
is not the intention of this paper to provide a detailed overview of institutional theory 
and its application to tax research.  
 
                                                        
7 Robert K Yin Case Study Research Design and Methods (5th ed, Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA 2014). 
8 Cedric Sandford Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1995) 405. 
9 International Finance Corporation The Costs of Tax Compliance in Ukraine (IFC, Washington DC, 2009) 95. 
Retrieved from www.ifc.org/Ukraine/IC. 
10 See further the discussion of institutional theory by Lisa Marriott The Politics of Retirement Savings Taxation: A 
Trans-Tasman Comparison (CCH Australia Ltd: Sydney 2010). 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the overall 
design of a VAT and identifies features of a VAT that make it either complex or simple. 
Section 3 reviews the Botswana VAT and the New Zealand GST designs. Possible VAT 
simplification measures for Botswana are identified in Section 4, while Section 5 
concludes with policy recommendations.   
 
2. DESIGN OF A VALUE ADDED TAX SYSTEM 
2.1 Synopsis  
The design of a VAT system is important as it affects the manner of tax compliance as 
well as taxpayer compliance costs. Certain features of a VAT, such as the number of 
VAT rates, exemptions and zero-rating of certain goods and services, complicate a 
VAT system. A complex VAT design has higher compliance costs that burden smaller 
businesses the most. Such a burden may be perceived as unfair and, consequentially, 
can arouse negative attitudes in taxpayers. This section does not aim to cover all aspects 
of a VAT system design. Readers interested in an in-depth discussion of the design of 
a VAT are referred to other studies.11  
 
2.2 Definition of a Value Added Tax 
The VAT is the predominant form of consumption tax across the globe,12 being now 
implemented by over 150 countries worldwide.13 It is alleged to be the most important 
single tax in developing and transitional countries,14 while in the European Union (EU), 
it is said to be the cornerstone of tax policy and the economic system.15 In Africa, the 
                                                        
11 For example: Alan Tait Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems (International Monetary Fund, 
1988); Sijbren Cnossen “Design of the Value Added Tax: Lessons from Experience” in Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi 
and Anwar Shah (eds) Tax Policy in Developing Countries (World Bank, 1991); Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean-
Paul Bodin and Victoria Summers The Modern VAT (International Monetary Fund, 2001); International Tax 
Dialogue The Value Added Tax: Experiences and Issues (International Tax Dialogue, 2005) <www.itdweb.org>; 
Richard Bird and Pierre-Pascal Gendron The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
12 Susan Symons, Neville Howlett and Katia Alcantara The Impact of VAT Compliance on Business (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2010) 5.  
13 Stephane Buydens Consumption Tax Trends 2010: VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Administration Issues 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011) 11; Ine Lejeune The EU VAT Experience: What 
are the Lessons? (Tax Analysts, 2011) 257.  
14 Bird and Gendron, above n 11, 1. 
15 Lejeune, above n 13, 257. 
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proliferation of VAT, has been phenomenal, with the majority of the African countries 
adopting a VAT of some sort. 
 
Martinez-Vasquez and Bird assert that the success of VAT reflects a number of factors. 
To begin with, VAT has a high revenue raising potential and is relatively simple, 
conceptually at least. In addition, VAT enhances economic efficiency, trade, and 
growth. Its relatively mild consequences on income distribution and equity may be 
alleviated with ease. Furthermore, fewer and relatively less complex political economy 
issues seem to interfere with its introduction and development, compared with other 
potential revenue raising taxes.16 
 
In addition, the spread of VAT across most continents signifies its value as a source of 
revenue in many countries.17 In the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) alone, VAT generated around 20 per cent of total tax revenues 
in 2015,18 and for many countries the VAT yield can be anywhere between less than 
one per cent and over ten per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).19 Keen and 
Lockwood assert that the VAT raises about 20 per cent of the world’s tax revenue and 
also that approximately four billion people are affected by it directly.20 Principally, 
countries that have a VAT generally have higher government tax revenues than those 
that do not.21  
 
2.3 Value Added Tax Design 
2.3.1 Overview 
The design of a VAT is important, not only to its success in achieving high compliance 
and meeting revenue targets, but also to the magnitude of VAT compliance costs 
                                                        
16 Jorge Martinez-Vasquez and Richard Bird Value Added Tax: Onward and Upward? International Studies Program 
Working Paper, 10-26 (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 2010) 1.  
17 Ebrill et al., above n 11, notes that, at the time, many countries had a VAT which raised, on average, 25 per cent 
of their tax revenue.  
18 Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development Revenue Statistics 2017: Tax Revenue Trends in the OECD 
(OECD, 2017) 3.  
19 Ebrill et al., above n 11, 8.   
20 Michael Keen and B Lockwood The Value Added Tax: Its Causes and Consequences, IMF Working Paper No 
183 (International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs and Secretary’s Departments, 2007) 3.  
21 Ebrill et al., above n 11, 8.  
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incurred by businesses in the process of complying with the VAT system. Good tax 
design seeks to minimise the real costs to society that are inherent even in the best 
designed taxes.22 Krever affirms that “…to a very large extent, the potential 
effectiveness of a VAT depends on the fundamental design of the legislation as well as 
the way the design is translated into law.”23 Complex VAT design leads to significant 
compliance costs. It also increases the possibility of noncompliance because it gives 
taxpayers the incentive to avoid tax by misclassifying goods or services as exempt or 
zero-rated.24  
 
According to Lejeune, the design of a best practice VAT requires a balance to be 
established between the objectives of three stakeholders: the government, businesses 
and citizens. The government’s principal aim is to increase the revenue necessary to 
fund public services (essentially: infrastructure, health, welfare security, and 
education), to attract and retain businesses as well as create new jobs and secure 
existing ones. The objectives of businesses, on the other hand, are to participate in 
‘global’ competition and maximise profit. Citizens usually seek a non-regressive and 
non-inflationary tax.25  
 
Key factors, namely VAT rates, zero rating, exemptions, as well as the registration 
threshold, are the cornerstones of VAT design. These factors determine: how much 
government revenue will be raised from VAT (after considering the administrative 
costs); the magnitude of compliance costs borne by taxpayers (businesses); and the 
regressivity of the VAT upon final consumers (citizens). The authors suggest that the 
manner and frequency of VAT returns filing are also important cornerstones as they 
have a direct bearing on the compliance costs borne by taxpayers. The elements of a 
conceptually simple VAT, as suggested by the United States Government 
Accountability Office (USGAO),26 are displayed in Table 1. Ideally, a conceptually 
                                                        
22 Richard Bird and Eric Zolt “Tax Policy in Emerging Countries” (2008) 26 Environment and Planning C-
Government and Policy 73, 76.   
23 Rick Krever VAT in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2008) 9.  
24 United States Government Accountability Office Value Added Tax. Lessons Learned from Other Countries on 
Compliance Risks, Administrative Costs, Compliance Burden and Transition: Report to Congressional Requesters 
(United States Government Accountability Office, 2008) 4-5. 
25 Lejeune, above n 13, 264.  
26 United States Government Accountability Office, above n 24, 12-13.  
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simple VAT would have a single rate, a zero threshold, be inclusive of all goods and 
services, with the exception of exports (at zero per cent), and use invoices for 
sales/purchases verification. 
 
Table 1: Elements of a Conceptually Simple VAT System 
Element Definition 
Single tax rate. One rate applies to the base. 
Broad, non-exclusionary 
tax base. 
All goods and services are subject to the VAT, including financial 
transactions and real estate. 
All business, government, 
and non-profit entities are 
taxed. 
All entities are subject to paying VAT on purchases and required to 
charge VAT on qualifying sales of goods and services. 
Destination principle. Goods and services are subject to taxation in the jurisdiction in 
which they are consumed. Therefore, imports are subject to VAT in 
the importing country, and exports (taxed at zero per cent) are 
excluded from the domestic tax base. 
Credit invoice mechanism. Tax calculations are based on valid invoices and sales receipts for 
each transaction by subtracting the taxes paid on all input 
purchases from taxes collected on all output sales.  
Source: United States Government Accountability Office, above n 24, 12-13. 
 
2.3.2 Value Added Tax Rate(s) 
The rate, or number of rates, at which VAT is imposed is a significant element in the 
design of the VAT. Tax administrations generally levy more than one VAT rate (being 
the standard rate and reduced rate(s)) on goods and services. The most common type of 
reduced rate is a zero rate, commonly applied on exports, and certain basic goods and 
services that are usually consumed by the poor and the less well-off.27 The application 
of a zero rate on exports ensures that the VAT is borne entirely by the final consumer 
in the country where consumption takes place, and is not recoverable in a foreign 
jurisdiction (often referred to as the destination principle of the VAT).  
 
                                                        
27 The government of Botswana imposes a zero rate on certain goods and services. See Government of Botswana, 
Value Added Tax Act (Government of Botswana, 2001) 72-83 and Government of Botswana Value Added Tax 
(Amendment) Act, 2015 (Botswana Government Gazette, 2015) A.1-2: <www.burs.org.bw>.  New Zealand has a 
zero rate only for exports and for transfers of what is known as a ‘going concern’. 
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In terms of the goods and services consumed by the ‘poor’, the use of the lower or zero 
rate(s) is intended to reduce the regressivity of the VAT on such consumers (equity 
considerations). It has, however, been argued that the use of lower or zero rates for 
redistribution purposes is practically limited, because the rich generally spend more, in 
absolute terms, on the rate-reduced commodities. Thus, the rate decrease benefits the 
rich more than the poor.28 Additionally, where there are other income redistribution 
instruments, it is less likely that social benefits will be derived from setting more than 
one rate of VAT.29 Ebrill et al. maintain that personal income tax provides a more 
effective way of redistributing income.30 Remaining issues of regressivity can be dealt 
with without the VAT, such as through income supplements and welfare payments from 
the government. 
 
Furthermore, having several VAT rates in a country complicates the VAT and increases 
its complexity,31 and resultant compliance costs, especially for small traders.32 As the 
number of rates increases, tax forms become more complicated and compliance costs 
tend to increase considerably. Moreover, a VAT system with many rates distorts 
consumer and producer choices, and invites rent reeking.33 The basic rule in VAT 
design is to have as few tax rates as will satisfy the preference of politicians.34 Similarly, 
Cnossen suggests that the differentiation of VAT rates should be kept to a minimum.35 
However, others propose that a conceptually simple VAT should have a single rate that 
applies to all goods and services.36  
 
                                                        
28 International Tax Dialogue, above n 11, 14-15.  
29 Ebrill et al., above n 11, 74.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Cnossen, above n 11, 82. 
32 For example, Milka Casanegra de Jantscher Problems of Administering a Value Added Tax in Developing 
Countries, International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/86/15, (International Monetary Fund, 1986) 3; Krever, 
above n 23, 19.  
33 Matt Benge, Marie Pallot and Hamish Slack “Possible Lessons for the United states from New Zealand’s GST” 
(2013) 66(2) National Tax Journal 479, 480.   
34 Tait, above n 11, 42.  
35 Cnossen, above n 11, 83.    
36 For example, United States Government Accountability Office, above n 24, 12; Bird and Gendron, above n 11, 
108.     
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Applying a single rate of VAT to all goods and services (with the exception of exports, 
at a zero rate) generally simplifies compliance.37 The reason a single rate reduces the 
burden of compliance is because: it makes record-keeping easier by eliminating the 
need to separate goods and services into different categories. Also, a single rate 
removes the incentive to intentionally misclassify items.38  
 
With regard to the magnitude of the VAT rate, a high rate is seen to be more effective 
than a low one. Tait maintains that levying a VAT at a low rate below 10 per cent might 
be considered a poor allocation of resources.39 In terms of increasing the VAT rate, as 
is common with many countries,40 Buydens advises that countries should consider the 
efficiency of rate increases compared with broadening the VAT base and decreasing 
the number of reduced rates.41 He suggests that reducing the number of exemptions to 
broaden the VAT base would enhance the efficiency and neutrality of the tax. 
Essentially, this offers an effective alternative to increasing VAT rates.42  
 
2.3.3 Exemptions  
Value added tax exemptions43 refer to the complete exclusion of certain goods and/or 
services from the tax base. Exemptions contradict the principle of neutrality which 
requires VAT to be a broad-based tax,44 and lead to breaks in the VAT chain,45 by 
                                                        
37 Ebrill et al., above n 11, 78. 
38 Ibid 78-79.  
39  Tait, above n 11, 39. 
40 Botswana increased the VAT rate from 10 per cent to 12 per cent on the 1st April 2010. Many other countries, for 
example, South Africa, Ghana and Singapore, have increased their VAT rates. In the OECD, 12 countries (Chile, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland and 
Turkey) have increased their VAT rate since 2000. See Buydens, above n 13, 72-74.  
41 Buydens, above n 13, 15. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Value Added Tax exemptions often include basic education services, basic health service, financial services, real 
estate and construction. See Ebrill et al., above n 11, 91-99. The different VAT exemptions by OECD countries are 
outlined in a recent OECD study of consumption tax trends. See Stephane Buydens Consumption Tax Trends 2012: 
VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Administration Issues (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2012) 86-88. In Botswana, the VAT exempt goods and services include accommodation, education 
services, health services provided by a public medical facility, financial services and supply of domestic passenger 
transportation. See Government of Botswana, above n 27.  
44 Buydens, above n 13, 15. 
45 Ebrill et al., above n 11, 85. 
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denying the businesses that trade in exempt supplies to claim the input VAT. Other 
problems of exemptions include tax revenue effects, distortion of input choices, an 
incentive to self-supply, disruption of the destination principle, an incentive to import 
VAT exempt inputs, strenuous record-keeping for partially exempt traders, and 
exemption creep.46  
 
Value Added Tax exemptions also result in the imposition of tax-on-tax (cascading) 
and introduces inequities in the VAT system which distorts production decisions.47 In 
addition, the exclusion of some goods and services from the tax base distorts consumer 
choices and reduces the tax revenue.48 Tait asserts that the more exempt goods and 
traders there are, the greater the possibility that value added is unintentionally taxed at 
different rates.49 Moreover, increased exemptions could possibly entice other traders to 
claim exemption for themselves and thereby erode the tax base. Accordingly, 
theoretically and practically, exemptions should be kept to a minimum,50 and limited 
to basic health, education and financial services.51  
 
2.3.4 Value Added Tax Registration Threshold 
The choice of a registration threshold is very important in the design and 
implementation of VAT.52 Value Added Tax registration thresholds differ from one 
country to another across the globe. For example, the VAT registration threshold in 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa is set at AUD75,000, NZD60,000 
(approximately AUD54,000) and ZAR1 million (AUD92,868),53 respectively. In 
Botswana, the VAT registration threshold is P1,000,000 (AUD128,000).54 A low 
registration threshold requires smaller businesses to adhere to the stringent 
                                                        
46 Ibid 83-90. Exemption creep is a situation whereby exemption creates direct pressure for further exemptions. 
47 For example, Tait, above n 11, 50; International Tax Dialogue, above n 11, 8.  
48 Cnossen, above n 11, 78. 
49 Tait, above n 11, 50. 
50 Ibid. 
51 For example, Cnossen, above n 11, 83; International Tax Dialogue, above n 11, 15.   
52 For example, Ebrill et al., above n 11, 113; Michael Keen and Jack Mintz “The Optimal Threshold for a Value 
Added Tax” (2004) 88(3-4) Journal of Public Economics 559, 559; International Tax Dialogue, above n 11, 16.  
53 The exchange rate of South African Rand (ZAR) to Australian Dollar (AUD) as at August 2018 was 0.09: 
<www.xe.com>. 
54 See the Botswana Pula – Australian Dollar exchange rate, above n 2.   
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requirements of the VAT (for example, proper record-keeping, VAT collection and 
remittance, and timely filing of VAT returns). This imposes a disproportionate 
compliance burden upon the smaller traders, which, in turn, may evoke negative 
attitudes (and tax evasion) from small businesses.   
 
On the contrary, a high registration threshold results in differential treatment of 
businesses, which, in turn, leads to distortions in competition in favour of small 
businesses below the registration threshold. Such distortions, implied by additional 
costs in the form of the tax liability and compliance costs, affect the VAT registered 
businesses.55 To this end, some argue that a low threshold is necessary to reduce 
incentives for malpractices such as sales suppression.56 Indeed the choice of an optimal 
VAT registration threshold is a very contentious issue.57    
 
Essentially, some sort of balance is required when deciding on the level of the 
registration threshold. Shome maintains that small businesses should be taxed for two 
reasons. To begin with, the contribution to the tax by small businesses, when combined 
with the medium-sized taxpayers, can be large at over a quarter of total revenue. 
Second, there is likely to be a strong effect upon the economic growth emanating from 
ignoring a large amount of potential tax revenue from particular sectors.58  
 
In contrast, Keen and Mintz assert that the revenue that is lost by raising the registration 
threshold and dropping many small businesses from the tax base, can be traded-off 
against the compliance costs saved by the taxpayers.59 Similarly, the International Tax 
Dialogue (ITD) affirms that balancing the government’s need for revenue against tax 
compliance costs suggests that it will generally be optimal to levy the tax only on 
taxpayers above some critical size, and entirely exclude all those below it from the 
                                                        
55 Ebrill et al., above n 11, 120.  
56 Benge et al., above n 33, 495.  
57 Keen and Mintz, above n 52, 559-560.  
58 Parthasarathi Shome Tax Administration and the Small Taxpayer Policy Discussion Paper No. 04/2, (International 
Monetary Fund Publications, 2004) 3-4.  
59 Keen and Mintz, above n 52, 562.  
12 
 
tax.60 With regard to most developing and transitional countries, it is likely wiser to set 
the registration threshold too high than too low.61 
 
2.3.5 Value Added Tax Design and Tax Compliance Costs 
As mentioned earlier, a VAT system can be either simple or complex depending on the 
number of VAT rates, the presence and number of zero-rated and exempt goods and 
services as well as the level of the registration threshold (whether it is relatively high 
or low). Other factors that affect the nature of a VAT system are the frequency of VAT 
returns filings and the system used in VAT returns filing (whether submitted online or 
in person).  
 
Many governments often incorporate small business ‘special treatment clauses’ or 
concessions in their tax policies in an attempt to mitigate the burden of tax compliance 
which often falls disproportionately upon this sector. In reality, in many countries, 
small businesses expect, and generally receive, special tax treatment or tax 
concessions.62 However, concessions in the form of lower VAT rates or exemptions 
lead to considerably higher compliance costs because businesses have to separate their 
stock at the checkout counter according to the tax treatment. Large businesses can 
automate this process and amortise the initial setup costs over high volumes of sales. 
Small businesses, on the other hand, rarely have automated checkout systems. They 
are, therefore, forced to amortise the costs of compliance over a much smaller sales 
volume. Thus, the burden of differentiating fully and lower taxed products falls 
inequitably on small firms.63  
 
Pope asserts that recurrent tax compliance costs are minimised under a simple tax which 
incorporates a single rate, a high threshold and a minimum of special exemptions, 
reliefs and provisions.64 Tax payment arrangements such as less frequent returns and 
                                                        
60 International Tax Dialogue, above n 11, 23.  
61 Bird and Gendron, above n 11, 3.  
62 Jeff Pope “Small Business Taxation: An Evaluation of the Role of Special Treatment Policies” (2008) 10(2) The 
Business Review, Cambridge 14, 14.  
63 Krever, above n 23, 19.  
64 Jeff Pope The Compliance Costs of Major Commonwealth Taxes in Australia (thesis submitted to the Faculty of 
Business of Curtin University of Technology in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, 1993) 81. 
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simplified methods of calculating the GST liability may be made in favour of small 
businesses to alleviate their burden of GST compliance.65  
 
3. VAT/GST DESIGNS IN BOTSWANA AND NEW ZEALAND  
3.1 The Design of the Botswana VAT system 
The VAT system in Botswana was introduced at a rate of 10 per cent in July 2002. In 
April 2010, the Botswana Unified Revenue Service (the BURS) increased the VAT rate 
to 12 per cent.66 This increase came about as a result of the 2009 recommendations 
made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (to strengthen tax administration and 
to increase the VAT rate and fuel levy to rates of nearby countries). The increase was 
aimed at enhancing the VAT revenue and possibly reducing Botswana’s dependence 
on mining revenue in the longer term.  
 
The Botswana VAT system, modelled on the traditional European VAT, allows for 
certain goods and services to be exempt while others are zero-rated.67 The VAT exempt 
goods and services consist primarily of financial, medical, accommodation in a 
dwelling and educational activities. Zero-rated goods and services comprise basic 
foodstuffs68 in their natural state, and not mixed with other products, exports, 
international transport services and paraffin.69  
 
                                                        
65 Jeff Pope “Estimating and Alleviating the Goods and Services Tax Compliance Cost Burden upon Small Business” 
(2001) 11(1) Revenue Law Journal 6, 16.  
66 International Monetary Fund Botswana: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice 
on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Botswana Country Report No. 
10/172, (International Monetary Fund, 2010) 18. 
67 Botswana Customs and Excise, A Guide to Botswana's Value Added Tax (Government of Botswana, 2001) 41. 
Exempt supplies, such as education services and public medical facilities, are not subject to VAT. They are not 
counted as part of a business’s taxable turnover. Zero-rated supplies are those that attract VAT at the rate of zero per 
cent, such as exports and basic food products. Sections 10 and 11 of the first schedule of the Botswana Value Added 
Tax Act provide a comprehensive list of exempt and zero-rated supplies. 
68 These include foods that are consumed mainly by the poor such as millet grain, wheat grain, maize cobs, flour, 
sugar, maize meal and millet meal.   
69 This list is by no means exhaustive. Readers interested in a complete list of zero-rated goods and services are 




Registration for VAT is compulsory for any business that makes taxable supplies of 
P1,000,000 (AUD128,000)70 or more per annum, or expects that this limit will be 
exceeded during the following 12 months. Compulsory VAT registration is not required 
if the business can clearly demonstrate that the value of the taxable supplies exceeded 
P1,000,000 due to the termination, or significant and permanent reduction in the size 
or scale, of a taxable activity carried on by the person; or the replacement of capital 
goods.71 Voluntary registration is open to businesses with a taxable income below 
P1,000,000 and this is done at the discretion of the Commissioner General of the 
Botswana Unified Revenue Service (BURS). The VAT Act No. 50:03 states that while 
a business can register voluntarily, the option to de-register can only be exercised two 
years after the date of registration. Failure to apply for registration when required is an 
offence that attracts high penalties. The penalties include fines, interest penalty for late 
payments and imprisonment.72  
 
The BURS classifies the VAT registered businesses into three groups namely A, B and 
C. Groups A and B comprise businesses with a turnover below P12 million (AUD1.5 
million) whereas Group C encompasses businesses that have an annual turnover 
exceeding P12 million. These groups are also distinguished by the manner in which 
they file VAT returns.73 Large businesses (Group C)74 file VAT returns monthly while 
groups A and B file VAT returns bimonthly on alternate months.75  
 
During the financial year 2014/15, the BURS introduced an online VAT returns filing 
system (e-filing). However, the BURS notes that “there has been a slow uptake of the 
use of e-services as most taxpayers continue to file manually”.76 Thus the frequency 
and manner of VAT returns filing in Botswana pose a question of the complexity of the 
                                                        
70 See the Botswana-Australia exchange rate, above n 2.  
71 Price Waterhouse Coopers Overview of VAT in Africa. (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011) 2. Retrieved from 
http://www.pwc.co.za/en/publications/overview-of-vat-in-africa.jhtml. 
72 Botswana Customs and Excise, above n 67, 36. 
73 Group A and B businesses file VAT returns on alternate months. This was done mainly to reduce congestion at 
the VAT office during the VAT returns filing period.  
74 The BURS set up a Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) to administer the tax affairs of large enterprises that contribute 
the largest portion of tax revenue. 
75 Botswana Customs and Excise, above n 67, 26.  
76 Government of Botswana BURS Annual Report, 2015 (Botswana Government, 2015) 29. 
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country’s VAT system and the burden of VAT upon businesses, especially small ones. 
The BURS has to encourage e-filing of VAT returns by offering free and ongoing 
training related to e-services and, where possible, subsidies related to computers and 
the internet for small businesses.   
 
3.2 Botswana Value Added Tax System Reforms 
The VAT system in Botswana has since gone through multiple reforms. The first two 
reforms came in the form of an increase in the VAT rate and VAT registration 
threshold. The VAT rate was increased from its introductory rate of 10 per cent to a 
current 12 per cent, while the registration threshold, which started off at P250,000, 
increased to P500,000 in April 2010.   
 
On the 23rd January 2015, the Botswana government amended the VAT registration 
threshold by increasing it to P1,000,000 (AUD128,000).77 In addition to the threshold 
amendment, the government introduced some new zero-rated goods into the VAT 
system in 2015.78 While, an increase in the number of zero-rated goods may reduce 
consumption costs of the poor, such a move actually complicates the VAT system and 
increases VAT compliance costs, especially for small businesses.  
 
Value added tax amendments require businesses to update their VAT accounting 
systems in order to meet new requirements. These reforms complicate the VAT system 
and make compliance arduous. Moreover, they increase VAT compliance costs and 
arouse negative attitudes in taxpayers, which in turn may lead to tax evasion. 
 
Value added taxpayers in Botswana have indicated that they find VAT requirements to 
be burdensome. The businesses that find VAT to be onerous and unreasonably 
complicated reported higher average VAT compliance costs and also that they resent 
doing their VAT work.79 This could possibly explain why Botswana faces an ongoing 
challenge of VAT non-compliance as evidenced by growing VAT arrears (see Figure 
1). The BURS mentioned that there is a culture of low tax compliance in the Botswana 
                                                        
77 See the exchange rate of Botswana Pula to Australian Dollar above, n 2.  
78 Government of Botswana Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Botswana Government Gazette, 2015) A.1-
2: <www.burs.org.bw>.  
79 Makara and Rametse, above n 4, 246.  
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market, among small to medium businesses, and that there is a need to engender 
compliance with revenue laws.80  
 
Figure 1: Value Added Tax Arrears
 
Source: Authors – Derived from the BURS Annual Reports (2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017) 
 
3.3 The Design of the New Zealand Goods and Services Tax System  
In New Zealand, GST was introduced on 1 October 1986. The New Zealand GST is 
broad-based and is currently levied at a rate of 15 per cent81 on almost all goods and 
services. The VAT registration threshold in New Zealand is currently NZD60,000 
(AUD54,300).82 The New Zealand GST system is considered to be a model system that 
represents a contrasting approach to that of the traditional European model. As part of 
a radical reform package in the mid-1980s, New Zealand introduced a broad-base low 
rate value added tax known as a Goods and Services Tax, while concurrently lowering 
marginal tax rates significantly (from a top rate of 66 per cent to that of 33 per cent), 
eliminated most exemptions and credits in the tax system, and embarked on major 
reform to tax filing obligations of individuals. When New Zealand introduced its GST 
system in 1986, it was at a rate of 10 per cent and a registration threshold of 
NZD24,000. The GST rate in New Zealand has been increased twice, with the latest 
increase coming in 2010 when the rate went from 12.5 per cent to 15 per cent.  
 
                                                        
80 Government of Botswana BURS Annual Report, 2012 (Botswana Government, 2012) 14. 
81 The original rate was 10 per cent in 1986, increasing to 12.5 per cent in July 1989 and 15 per cent from October 
2010. 
82 The original threshold was NZD24,000 in 1986, increasing to: NZD30,000 from October 1990, NZD 40,000 from 































New Zealand’s GST is known for having an extremely broad base, very few 
exemptions, and having a focus on efficiency. For example, Vial observes that the NZ 
GST is not only “… an international benchmark for indirect tax design but that it has 
the highest C-efficiency ratio in the OECD (at 93.5 per cent).83 The C-efficiency is the 
ratio of VAT revenue to consumption expenditure, divided by the standard tax rate, 
expressed as a percentage. Politicians have resisted major changes to the GST since its 
introduction, with the exception of increasing the rate twice and the registration 
threshold three times, increasing the breadth to include certain excluded areas (for 
example, certain financial services and certain electronic transactions), and remedial 
legislative amendments. 
 
Maples and Sawyer84 explore the international impact of the New Zealand GST model 
in contrast to that of the traditional VAT model. They identify 18 “GSTs” that have 
been developed with the initial starting point being New Zealand’s GST. With the 
exception of a few jurisdictions (including Singapore), the other jurisdictions have 
moved away from the “purity” of the NZ GST to introduce multiple rates, more 
exemptions and the like.  
 
In terms of aspects of New Zealand’s GST that work in support of small businesses, 
they may file GST returns every six months, provided certain criteria are met. 
Specifically, their turnover cannot exceed NZD500,000 (AUD452,500) in past 12 
months or not be expected to exceed in next 12 months. Otherwise, they will need to 
adopt standard two monthly period (a one month return period applies for large 
taxpayers). There are several methods for accounting for GST that apply for small 
businesses. The standard method is the invoice (or accruals) basis, or the payments 
basis (a type of cash accounting system). The payments basis applies to non-profit 
bodies, persons with less than NZD2 million (AUD1.81 million) taxable supplies for a 
month, or where the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Commissioner) is satisfied this 
basis is appropriate. A third method is known as the hybrid basis (introduced in 1991) 
                                                        
83 Peter Vial, “The Sustainability of the New Zealand Tax Base: Are we at the End of the Road for the New Zealand 
Tax System?” (2009) 15(1) New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 17, 22; citing Richard Krever and 
David White (eds), GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Thomson Reuters 2007) viii.  
84 Andrew Maples and Adrian Sawyer, “The New Zealand GST and its Global Impact: 30 Years On”, (2017) 23(1) 
New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy, 9. 
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which can be used by any person or business registered for GST. It has some cash flow 
disadvantages in that input tax credits cannot be claimed until payment is made but 
output tax must be paid at the earlier of the issue of an invoice and receipt of payment.  
 
There are no special rates or lower rates for any items, other than the limited situations 
where the zero rate applies (exports and transfers of a going concern). Certain land 
translations have also been exempted form GST. Thus the standard rate of GST applies 
to almost all transactions. That said, it remains a relatively complex tax to apply as 
reflected in the ever growing legislative provisions and challenges faced by the courts.  
During the 1990s and 2000s, New Zealand undertook a rewrite of its Income Tax Act.  
The Tax Rewrite Project did not extend to rewriting other major tax statues, such as the 
Tax Administration Act 1994 and the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985. A call has 
been made to no avail rewrite the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 from New 
Zealand’s highest court, the Supreme Court:85 
 
“. . . it is to be hoped that once the redrafting exercise on the Income Tax Act is 
completed the team will move on to the [GSTA 1985], which is not, and never 
has been, a user-friendly statute”. 
 
In summary, New Zealand’s GST reflects the purist and most efficient GST model 
anywhere around the world. It has remained robust since its inception against 
conceptual reform.   
 
4. POSSIBLE VALUE ADDED TAX SIMPLIFICATION MEASURES 
4.1 Overview  
It has been suggested that complex VAT requirements lead to high VAT compliance 
costs.86 The compliance costs of VAT and other taxes do not affect businesses equally. 
As a result of the fixed cost nature of tax compliance costs, small businesses carry a 
burden of these costs that is not proportional to their size. The regressivity of tax 
                                                        
85 Rt Hon Peter Blanchard, ‘‘Some Basic Concepts of New Zealand GST’’ in Rick Krever and David White, above 
n 83, 91 at 92. 
86 Makara and Rametse, above n 4.  
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compliance costs puts small firms at a competitive disadvantage,87 and leads to a 
competition policy concern by conflicting with the aim of establishing a ‘level playing 
field’ between all types and sizes of business.88 Thus, complex VAT requirements place 
small businesses at a competitive disadvantage. The following section discusses the 
possible policy measures that can help to simplify the VAT system in Botswana.  
 
Key policy recommendations for the possible simplification of the Botswana VAT are 
suggested. These recommendations are inspired by the design of the New Zealand GST, 
which is popularly known as a model GST.  
 
4.2 Introduction of the Cash Accounting Method for Value Added Tax 
The system of cash accounting is seen as a measure that can simplify the VAT system. 
Cash accounting allows businesses to account for VAT only when they receive cash for 
taxable supplies or when they make payment for goods and services bought. This 
system has been used in some countries such as the United Kingdom, where it was 
reported to lead to cost savings and benefits for businesses.89 In Australia, the cash 
accounting system was introduced as part of the simplified tax system. Small businesses 
with an aggregated turnover of less than AUD10 million can account for GST on a cash 
basis. Such businesses account for GST on the Business Activity Statement (BAS) 
covering the period during which they received (made) payment for sales (purchases).90 
The payments (or cash) basis method has been available in New Zealand from the 
commencement of its GST, with the hybrid basis91 available since 1991. 
 
                                                        
87 Michael Godwin and Cedric Sandford “Simplifying VAT for Small Traders” (1983) 13(52) Accounting and 
Business Research, 281. 
88 Jeff Pope, above n 65.    
89 National Audit Office HM Customs and Excise: Cost to Business of Complying with VAT Requirements (HMSO, 
1994) 7.  
90 Australian Taxation Office Accounting for GST on a Cash Basis. Retrieved from 
https://www.ato.gov.au/business/gst/accounting-for-gst-in-your-business/choosing-an-accounting-
method/?anchor=Accounting_for_GST_on_a_cash_basis#Accounting_for_GST_on_a_cash_basis.   
91 The hybrid basis is a system where a GST-registered entity accounts for GST on its sales (and other income) using 
the invoice (or accruals) basis and accounts for its GST on purchases and expenses using the payments (or cash) 
basis. In order to use this basis of accounting for GST, a business must apply in writing to the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue for approval.  
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A recent study on the cash flow and managerial benefits of VAT in Botswana found 
that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) (Groups A and B businesses), which had 
settlement periods of three months, incurred cash flow costs of BWP9 million in 
2010/2011.92 An introduction of the cash accounting system will eliminate this cost for 
businesses.  
 
4.3 Reduction of Value Added Tax Returns Filing Frequency  
The frequency of VAT returns filing in Botswana is a major concern, especially for 
small businesses. Small and medium-sized businesses file their VAT returns every two 
months, while larger businesses file VAT returns monthly. A reduction of VAT filing 
frequency, from bimonthly to six monthly, will reduce the burden and magnitude of 
VAT compliance costs for small businesses. Eligible small businesses in New Zealand 
are able to file VAT returns every six months. In addition to a reduction of VAT 
compliance costs, administrative costs incurred by BURS will also reduce, allowing the 
revenue authority to focus resources on large taxpayers that contribute the larger share 
of the VAT revenue.  
 
4.4 Broadening (and altering) of the Value Added Tax Base 
The presence of zero-rated and exempt goods and services complicates a VAT system. 
A recent study by Makara and Rametse reports that 77 per cent of businesses that trade 
in VAT exempt and zero-rated goods and services find the Botswana VAT system to 
be unreasonably complicated and, as such, have concerns when undertaking their VAT 
work.93 As mentioned earlier, the BURS has reported that there is a culture of 
noncompliance among small businesses in Botswana and the revenue authority 
grapples with mounting VAT arrears. The authors suggest that the BURS should adopt 
a broad-based VAT system, similar to the New Zealand GST system, which has 
minimal exempt and zero-rated goods and services. Given the economic circumstances 
of Botswana, the VAT should also increase its threshold for registration. With regard 
to the foods consumed by the poor, the Botswana government can consider introducing 
income supplements and welfare payments in order to simplify the VAT. 
 
                                                        
92 Makara and Rametse, above n 6, 440.   
93 Makara and Rametse, above n 4, 261.   
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New Zealand more recently included online services within the scope of its GST94 and 
proposes to include online services in the GST tax base with effect from late 2019.95 In 
contrast, certain land transactions have been made zero rated for GST purposes in order 
to simplify the operation of GST with respect to land transactions. The Compulsory 
Zero Rating (CZR) rules96 were introduced in 2011 and require a 15 percent transaction 
that would normally attract GST at 15 percent to be zero-rated if: 
• The transaction involves land (any interest in land will be sufficient); 
• The vendor is GST-registered; and 
• The purchaser (or recipient, such as a nominee) acquires the property to carry 
on a taxable activity and not as a principal place of residence. The residence 
exception covers associates of the purchaser.  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
This article has investigated optimal design features of a VAT. Specifically, the paper 
has discussed the design features of the Botswana VAT and the New Zealand GST in 
order to identify possible policy measures that can help simplify the VAT system in 
Botswana. These policy recommendations are cautiously made owing to the size, 
economic, political and governance differences in the two countries.  
 
Prior studies have reported that small business taxpayers in Botswana perceive the VAT 
to be burdensome and costly. This could be due to the frequency with which small 
businesses are required to file VAT returns in Botswana. Other problem areas include 
the use of accrual method of accounting for VAT and the presence of exempt and zero-
rated goods and services. This paper recommends that the BURS should consider 
introducing the cash accounting method for VAT, reducing the frequency of VAT 
returns filing for small businesses from bimonthly to semi-annually, broadening the 
value added tax base and increasing the VAT registration threshold. More work is 
                                                        
94 See Taxation (Residential Land Withholding Tax, GST on Online Services, and Student Loans) Act 2016. 
95 See further: New Zealand Government (2018), GST on low-value imported goods: An offshore supplier 
registration system: A government discussion document, Wellington, May, 
http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-dd-gst-low-value-goods.pdf. 
96 See further: Inland Revenue, “Goods and Services Tax – Compulsory Zero-rating of Land Rules (General 




necessary to investigate the complexity of the VAT system in Botswana further, in 
order to uncover the reasons for the noncompliance culture that is reported to be 
prevalent among small businesses. Future studies should also look into the VAT e-filing 
system and investigate why small businesses are slow in accepting and using this 
system.  
 
This study has a number of limitations. First, the comparison undertaken with Botswana 
is with one jurisdiction only, namely New Zealand. The recommendations may have 
differed should one or more countries have been included or if the sole comparative 
country was different, such as Australia. Second, the paper focuses on major 
components of the respective VAT/GST of the two countries, and does not explore the 
complexities of the legislative provisions in detail, or the associated case law.  
 
